Argentina pulls back on currency swap & Wang Yi's UN LAC meetings
Plus: Mapping China's foreign ministry's top LAC-focused officials
Good morning! I took a week off, so today’s edition of Chaufa covers May 11 to June 8.
The Top Six Stories:
While visiting the United Nations in New York in part for a Meeting of the Group of Friends of Global Governance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with a number of Latin American and Caribbean officials. Wang mostly discussed global governance and political cooperation issues with these leaders, though he notably raised the Taiwan issue with Cuba, Costa Rica, and Panama. Meetings include:
Seeking to smooth over recent tensions, Wang met the Panamanian foreign minister. FM Wang argued that “China-Panama ties should not be subject to third-party interference” and highlighted the Taiwan issue.
Wang Yi discussed with Manuel Tovar the Chinese-Costa Rican Free Trade Agreement, the One China Principle, and broader political and economic ties (FMPRC).
The wording of the Taiwan references in the Costa Rica and Panama meetings suggests that the Chinese government remains most concerned about Taiwan finding a diplomatic opening for unofficial ties with its recent former diplomatic partners in Central America.
Colombian foreign minister Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio chatted about the Belt and Road Initiative, the One China Principle, trade, and broader political cooperation. (Xinhua)
In a face-to-face with the Cuban foreign minister, Wang expressed support for Cuba in the face of increased U.S. pressure. (FMPRC)
In a meeting with the Trinidad and Tobago foreign minister, Wang reviewed people-to-people ties, trade, and the One China Principle. (Xinhua)
Wang and Argentine Foreign Minister Quirno discussed global governance and the UN system, as well as trade and agriculture ties. (FMPRC)
The Uruguayan foreign minister was told by Wang Yi that “Uruguay is an engine of peace and a stabilizing factor in Latin America.” The two also discussed broader UN issues.
Partially in response to U.S. concerns, the Argentine central bank announced that it has significantly reduced its liabilities under its currency swap agreement with China. Activated funds are down to $675 million, a reduction from $5 billion in 2023. However, the country’s central bank officials claimed that they were in talks to extend the swap line for another three years beyond its August 2026 expiration.
Still, broader commercial ties remain close: President Milei approved in mid-May a series of investment incentives for a $1.2 billion Ganfeng-led mining project in Jujuy.
For context, the U.S. Treasury Department provided a currency swap to support Argentina’s economy last fall. At the time, it hinted that it provided this support to combat Chinese influence in the country. While the Trump administration may be successful at reducing Beijing’s economic leverage over Buenos Aires, the Argentine Central Bank’s decision to renegotiate the swap for another three years and the Milei administration’s granting of investment incentives to a Chinese company shows the limits to the Trump administration’s ability to end the longstanding Sino-Argentine economic partnership.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to Ottawa for the first time in a decade to meet with Prime Minister Carney and Foreign Minister Anand. During the visit, Wang suggested that trade between Canada and China could double by 2030. Aside from trade, the two sides also reportedly discussed “consular issues, foreign interference, forced labor and human rights.” (FMPRC)
Building on Prime Minister Carney’s historic visit to Beijing earlier this year, Wang Yi’s travel to Ottawa demonstrates how much Sino-Canadian relations have improved since the nadir of the Trudeau government.
Looking forward to the second half of 2026, it will be important to watch whether President Xi decides to add a stopover through Canada on his planned September and December travel to the United States. A visit to Canada would further cement the improved Sino-Canadian relationship.
Paraguayan President Peña concluded his first trip to Taiwan by signing agreements on information security and smart technology, digital governance, and judicial cooperation. Taiwanese and Paraguayan authorities also agreedto professional education exchanges for banking executives, and the two countries’ business associations deepenedtrade and investment ties. As per usual, the Chinese government condemned the trip by calling the South American delegation “pawns of Taiwan’s independence forces.”
This visit further cements the Taiwanese-Paraguayan relationship, at least through the end of President Peña’s term in office. Given the closeness of the relationship under the ruling Colorado Party, it is highly unlikely that Asunción pursues diplomatic relations with Beijing in the near future.
It is notable that despite Paraguay’s economy’s traditional dependence on agriculture, the government is successfully leveraging its relationship with Taiwan to improve its technology sector.
The Honduran foreign minister told news outlets in mid-May that his government was still analyzing whether to flip diplomatic ties to Taiwan. The remarks came right before the country’s congress passed a law on “supervising and regulating businesses of Chinese origin that operate in Honduras.” The former foreign minister from the Castro government accused the Asfura administration of “freezing” relations with China.
The Asfura administration is in a difficult spot at the moment: while Asfura promised to flip ties, a diplomatic change from Beijing back to Taipei could have economic consequences. Still, the recent congressional action on Chinese-origin businesses shows how controversial the diplomatic change remains.
In the face of Trump administration pressure, China reiterated its support for Cuba by donating 15,600 tons of rice and reaffirming ties during a foreign ministers meeting in New York. The Chinese foreign ministry also denouncedthe U.S. indictment of former Cuban leader Castro. Still, the U.S. government alleged that “China and Russia have in recent years expanded their intelligence operations in Cuba.”
Despite their status as fellow Communist-ruled regimes, the Sino-Cuban relationship has been fraught since the Sino-Soviet split. In recent years, this frustration has shifted from ideological disagreements to frustration that Cuba has not sufficiently reformed its economy.
However, the Chinese government has offered rhetorical and humanitarian assistance to the Cubans in recent years, and Chinese companies, including energy and telecom firms, operate in the country. U.S. secondary sanctions against these companies could threaten their global operations.
If you’re not already a subscriber, make sure to not miss the next edition👇
Longer thoughts
The Shape of China’s LAC Foreign Policy: The Foreign Ministry
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s (王毅) recent meetings with his Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) counterparts on the sidelines of the UN are a reminder that while numerous Chinese actors work across the hemisphere, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is at the heart of implementing Beijing’s foreign policy. To better understand MOFA’s presence, I thought it would be helpful to map out who actually is in charge of LAC policy in the ministry.
MOFA’s position in China’s foreign policy landscape
Unlike in other countries, the Chinese foreign ministry is a relatively weak state institution, as it is focused on implementing, rather than designing, China’s foreign policy. Most major foreign policy decisions are decided by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Foreign Affairs Commission,1 relegating MOFA to the implementation space.
MOFA’s relatively weak position can also be attributed to its numerous competitors in the foreign policy space: aside from the usual suspects like the commerce ministry and the military, Chinese foreign policy implementation actors include the CCP’s International Liaison Department, numerous provincial and local governments, and the party’s United Front Work Department (not to mention the countless Chinese state-owned and private companies operating across the region).
That said, MOFA still plays several important roles in Chinese foreign policy. First, it uniquely runs regular press conferences that communicate the CCP’s thinking on day-to-day foreign policy issues. And like most foreign ministries, MOFA manages the PRC’s embassies and consulates throughout the region, allowing it to take the lead in hosting most in-country meetings and maintaining relationships with local officials and civil society.
The Senior Leadership
MOFA is led by Wang Yi, who has served in the role (minus a six-month break) since 2013. He is arguably one of the most powerful foreign ministers in recent decades due to his longevity and concurrent position as Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission.
As this past month’s meetings at the United Nations show, Wang occasionally engages on LAC issues and meets with his LAC counterparts. That said, he rarely travels to the region and is clearly more preoccupied with more pressing regions and issues.
Vice Ministers
Below Wang, MOFA is led by a Secretary, an Executive Vice Minister, two Vice Ministers, and four Assistant Vice Ministers. Given its relatively marginal status in China’s foreign relations, MOFA lacks a dedicated Vice or Assistant Minister exclusively for LAC affairs.
Two of the three leading officials under Wang Yi have had at least some Western Hemisphere exposure. Publicly at least, Executive Vice Minister Ma Zhaoxu (马朝旭) has stepped back from his previous engagement with Latin America, though he has engaged quite extensively on Canadian relations over the past year with five major meetings since 2025. Vice Minister Hua Chunying (华春莹) has also had limited engagement with LAC, having engaged with a multi-party delegation from Mexico, hosted a group of young Latin American scholars, and met with Uruguay’s Deputy Foreign Minister. However, the vast majority of their public meetings over the past couple of years have been on other geographies, suggesting LAC is not one of their core concerns.
By contrast, the other Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu (苗得雨) appears to almost exclusively work on Africa and Middle East issues and has not publicly engaged with the region so far this year. This is particularly notable since he previously engaged quite extensively on Latin America (meeting with the Peruvian, Cuban, and Brazilian ambassadors in 2025) when he was formerly in an Assistant Minister role.
Assistant Ministers
Of the Assistant Ministers, only Cai Wei (蔡伟) and Hong Lei (洪磊) are publicly engaged on LAC issues, but Cai seems to have the lead responsibility on Latin America and the Caribbean. This makes sense given his background, as his Baidu page reports that he served at least three tours through MOFA’s LAC department, including as the unit’s Director-General.2
Why do I think Cai is among the most important regular MOFA official on LAC issues under Wang? Well, aside from his prior LAC experience, Cai was the official who led the press conference when MOFA released its third white paper on the region in late 2025, and in the past nine months he’s met with officials from Jamaica, Argentina, Suriname, Brazil, and Chile. Further signaling his LAC expertise, Cai also was the MOFA official who met with the head of the Russian foreign ministry’s Latin America and Caribbean Department when the Russian diplomat visited Beijing this past March.
Compared to Cai, Hong’s engagement with LAC appears to be more minor and ceremonial. Hong also serves as the head of protocol, where he is responsible for accepting new ambassadors. Hence, he met with the recently arrived Uruguayan,Peruvian, and Surinamese ambassadors. Still, he is likely a familiar face for the LAC diplomatic community in Beijing.
LAC-focused MOFA officials
Outside of the Vice and Assistant Foreign Ministers, MOFA also has Special Representatives — according to Baidu, these officials “enjoy the treatment as the highest leader of the government or the organization” on their particular issue. Since 2015, the MOFA has had a Special Representative lead the government’s work on LAC affairs, and since 2021 the role has been filled by former ambassador to Brazil and Mexico Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪).
With his lengthy experience and relatively high rank in the CCP (he’s been a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), Qiu is possibly the most visible member of the PRC’s foreign policy in the region. Aside from his recent regional visits highlighted above, Qiu attends LAC-related events around the PRC, most memorably visiting Venezuela the weekend that Nicolas Maduro was removed from Caracas by the U.S. military. Other examples of his work include meeting with the LAC diplomatic corps in Beijing and attending the opening ceremony of the China-Latin America Sustainable Food Innovation Forum.
Working under Qiu, much of the day-to-day management of MOFA’s LAC policy in Beijing falls in the hands of the Director-General (DG) of the Latin America and Caribbean Department, former Ambassador to Mexico Zhang Run (张润). In his 30-year career, Zhang has almost exclusively focused on LAC policy, having served in Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina. He also had three stints in MOFA’s LAC department.
Zhang started the role less than a year ago but is already a fairly active force in China-LAC affairs. Most recently, he’s celebrated long-standing diplomatic relations with Guyana, called for new direct flights to Latin America, and traveled to Cuba.
Underneath Zhang, the LAC affairs department has three Deputy Director-Generals: Chen Xiaoling (陈晓玲),3 Tang Lingyun (唐凌云), and Sun Yi (孙怡). None of these officials are senior enough yet to have served as ambassadors in the region, but they all certainly have Spanish or Portuguese language skills and LAC-related experience: Chen worked as a deputy consul-general in Brazil, Tang served in Barcelona and was an alternate observer to the OAS, and Sun was a counselor at the embassy in Buenos Aires.
It’s a bit of a black box on who serves under the Deputy DGs, though prior research has suggested that each of the Deputy DGs manage a couple of divisions. In turn, each of these divisions has 4-6 desk officers working on a particular issue or country.
The Roundup
Politics and Security
Following the trip to New York and Canada, Wang took part in the fifth China-Brazil Foreign Ministerial-Level Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue with Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira in Beijing, where the two reviewed multilateral cooperation and the political outlook for the bilateral relationship. (FMPRC)
The Chinese ambassador to Panama held a press conference where she affirmed support for the neutrality of the Panama Canal, expressed confidence that the two countries will eventually agree to an FTA, and stated that her government would “not allow” Taiwan to establish an unofficial diplomatic mission (via a trade office) in Panama City.
A delegation from Shaanxi province led by Xianyang Deputy Mayor Wang Hongbing traveled to Azcapotzalco, Mexico to discuss political, economic, and cultural exchanges.
The Nicaraguan capital city of Managua signed a sister city agreement with Chengdu.
The Chinese and Surinamese presidents exchanged words of congratulations on the 50th anniversary of relations. (China Daily) The Caribbean president later gave an interview to Xinhua about the importance of Sino-Surinamese relations.
The Venezuelan government issued a statement upholding its adherence to the One China Principle.
Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure
China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) won a $115 million tender to build section 1A of the Fifth Bridge in Guayaquil, Ecuador.
Jamaican mining minister Green traveled to China to meet with executives from Jiuquan Iron and Steel Company (JISCO) to discuss reopening the Alpart bauxite plant in St. Elizabeth.
During a visit to Guyana, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg reportedly suggested that the United States was seeking to compete with Chinese companies in the country’s bauxite sector.
Suriname’s President Jennifer Geerlings-Simons attended an unveiling ceremony for the Power China-constructed Villages Micro-grid Solar Project Phase II.
Despite the recent change in government, the Chinese ambassador to Bolivia, Wang Liang, suggested that Chinese businesses are still interested in investing in Bolivia but are first evaluating the country’s reforms before making investment decisions.
The massive and controversial Chinese infrastructure-building company CHEC opened an office in Chile.
The Chinese-funded and built National Stadium in El Salvador is reportedly 50% complete.
Two unnamed Chinese companies are reportedly looking at building a new $300 million bridge between Argentinaand Uruguay.
Technology
Brazilian Minister of Communications Frederico de Siqueira Filho traveled to Beijing for negotiations with Chinese companies like ZTE and SpaceSail over investments in data centers, artificial intelligence, satellite connectivity, and 5G expansion.
The Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA) signed an MOU with the Chinese Institute of Research on Water Resources and Hydroelectric Energy (IWHR) on research, innovation and technological development related to water.
Trade
The Panamanian president suggested that Beijing and Panama City would be able to renew a maritime agreement that “gives advantages to the Panamanian fleet in” China.
Nicaragua further officially lowered tariffs on Chinese goods in accordance with the two countries’ Free Trade Agreement. (CGTN)
The Bolivia-China Friendship Association and the Chinese Business Chamber in Bolivia hosted a trade cooperation forum in Tarija.
Chinese and Peruvian officials met to discuss the pending ratification of the two countries’ updated FTA.
A meat industry delegation led by the Uruguayan Undersecretary of the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries met with the Chinese General Administration of Customs to regain access to the PRC market.
A dozen Chinese-owned retail stores in the Dominican Republic that employ about 2,000-3,000 workers have been forced to shut down due to unusual extended government investigations and “increasingly strict official regulations.
The Chinese ambassador to Quito visited Guayaquil to discuss the benefits of the China-Ecuador FTA with executives from aquaculture and banana businesses.
Taiwan
Canadian Conservative MP Michael Chong traveled to Taiwan, prompting a diplomatic backlash from Beijing. Later, Liberal Party MP Judy Sgro announced that she is planning to lead a delegation to Taiwan this fall.
Ten of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, including Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, St. Vincent, St. Kitts, and St. Lucia expressed support for Taiwan rejoining the World Health Assembly.
Taiwanese Control Yuan President Lee Hung-chun met with a delegation from the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office to discuss regional and international human rights collaboration.
The St. Vincent Ministry of Agriculture and the local Taiwan Technical Mission launched the “Agricultural Productivity Recovery and Young Farmers’ Training Project.”
U.S. and Taiwanese diplomats jointly hosted a Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) cybersecurity conference in Belize. Additionally, the $4.4 million Taiwan-funded road improvements to the Corozal–Sarteneja Road are reportedly underway.
Taiwan plans to donate two electric buses to St. Kitts and Nevis. The Taiwanese government also handed overunspecified “project equipment” from the Women’s Employment, Entrepreneurship and Financial Inclusion (WEEFI) project. Meanwhile, the North American Taiwanese Medical Association (NATMA) visited Nevis for a medical mission and the Taiwan Technical Mission (TTM) held a workshop on papaya cultivation.
Culture and society
Uruguay announced it will give visa exemptions to Chinese passport holders. The move comes as a response to the Chinese government giving Uruguayan citizens visa-free access in 2025. (Xinhua)
The Coordination of Integration of Peasant Economic Organizations of Bolivia (CIOEC Bolivia) and the Chinese pharmaceutical company Jilin Tiansanqi Pharmaceutical Company signed an agreement on traditional herbal medicine cooperation.
The University of Shandong, the Mexican National Institute of Anthropology and History, and the China-Mexico Cultural Development Foundation signed an agreement to create the China-Mexico Archaeological Research Center.
Colombia received a computer equipment donation and signed an agreement seeking to explore a new solar project for vulnerable communities. The University of Antioquia also signed agreements with the Agricultural University of Southern China on research exchanges and a new agro-industrial technology and innovation center.
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Latin America hosted a dialogue on “civilization and governance.”
In an effort to generate goodwill, the Chinese Embassy in Panama donated soccer uniforms, televisions, and laptops to the National Athletic Sports Society Football Club of the National Police of Panama. (Xinhua)
Analysis and opinion
Brian Fonseca finds in Foreign Policy that “the U.S. can’t exclude China from Latin America” and instead suggests offering “countries better strategic alternatives.”
An Evan Ellis article in The Diplomat discusses how “Chinese activities in Bolivia have deteriorated remarkably from their heyday under the populist leftist governments,” while a response article by Gustavo Nakamuro in UPI argues that “Bolivia’s troubled path with China is therefore not only a warning about Beijing’s methods. It is a warning about the fragility of states that lack the institutional strength to manage powerful outside actors.”
Writing in Infobae, Jessica Garcia argues that “the strengthening of the relationship between China and Nicaragua shows an authoritarian convergence based on the transfer of security capacities and alignment of regulatory frameworks, accelerating the consolidation of opaque and restrictive political models.” Relatedly, Ralph Jennings reports in the SCMP that “Nicaragua could be shaping up as the next economic battleground between the two powers.”
A piece by Rob Pierce in the National Interest on illegal Chinese fishing in the Western Hemisphere suggests that the U.S. Coast Guard should “expand joint training and targeted patrols with at-risk partners... conduct Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations... and enhance maritime domain awareness.
Carlos Ruiz-Hernandez wrote for Americas Quarterly that in the context of U.S.-China rivalry, “a coherent foreign policy and a long-term strategy for the [Panamanian] Canal are necessary in times of geopolitical change.”d
The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian published an op-ed by Mariano Browne that argued that China can provide an alternative to the United States in the Caribbean.
Discussing the proposed trans-oceanic railroad from Brazil to Peru, Leslie Moreno Custodio and Jorge Carrascoraise concerns in Dialogue Earth about the environmental costs of the project. Also in Dialogue Earth, John Bartlett wrote about the U.S.-Chinese lithium race in Chile.
Leila Miller and Farah Master wrote a long-form story for Reuters on how China’s fishing fleet is raising concerns about overfishing in Argentina’s fisheries.
The Caracas Chronicles has a new piece by Andrés R. Bermúdez García that argues that the elite extraction model in Venezuela has hurt both Chinese and U.S. investment opportunities.
Although Foreign Minister Wang currently (and unusually) sits as the commission’s director, the broader ministry as a whole is still often considered by academics to be weaker implementing agency.
Interestingly, he appears to have never served in the hemisphere outside of Canada and the United States
Chen is fairly new — when I did this exercise last year, Chen was not one of the Deputy DGs.